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FORMALISM, PRAGMATISM, AND THE 
CONSERVATIVE CRITIQUE OF THE 
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Michael E. Solimine* 
NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES 
WITH THE STATES. By John T. Noonan, Jr. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 2002. Pp. ix, 203. Cloth, $24.95. 
INTRODUCTION: THE EMBARRASSING ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
For many years the Second Amendment to the Constitution1 was 
construed by most authorities to grant a communal right to bear arms, 
through state militias and the like. Some years ago Sanford Levinson 
labeled this interpretation "embarrassing" to liberal scholars.2 That 
characterization was deserved, Levinson argued, since liberal aca­
demics had been eager to defend expansive interpretations of other 
rights-granting provisions of the Constitution.3 But they failed to do so 
when it came to language in the Second Amendment, which could be 
plausibly construed to grant an individual right to bear arms. The 
failure might be attributed, in part, to the conservative, anti-gun­
control agenda that such an interpretation might serve. 
A similar dynamic4 is at work for conservative scholars and the 
Eleventh Amendment.5 Read literally, without the nuances of history 
* Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.A. 
1978, Wright State; J.D. 1981, Northwestern. Ann Althouse, Jim Pfander, Wendy Parker, 
David Shapiro, and Jim Walker provided perceptive comments on an earlier draft of this 
Review. The research assistance of Jennifer Livingston is gratefully appreciated. 
l. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
2. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989). 
3. Id. at 642. 
4. I do not contend that the analogy is exact. For one thing, the Eleventh Amendment 
on its face purports to be a rule of construction aimed at Article III, while the Second 
Amendment is a free-standing provision. For another, the Supreme Court's current view of 
the Eleventh Amendment, whatever else you care to say about it, is at least arguably sup­
ported by long-standing precedent. In contrast, the Court's Second Amendment jurispru­
dence is characterized, to date, by its paucity. 
5. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit 
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
1463 
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and case law, the Amendment might be read as a mundane house­
keeping measure for federal courts. On its face, it just prohibits suits in 
federal court against a state by citizens of another state, or those of a 
foreign state. But the Amendment has not been read literally:6 today 
its reach extends to any suit in federal court for damage relief by any 
citizen against an unconsenting state, with only a limited opportunity 
for Congress to statutorily authorize such suits. And by analogy, the 
penumbra of the Amendment extends to lawsuits for damages based 
on violations of federal law against states in their own courts. These 
interpretations should be embarrassing to conservatives, since they are 
at war with the text of the Amendment, and draw little support from 
history or what we know of the intent of the framers and ratifiers of 
the Amendment. Yet many conservatives cheer on - or do not 
criticize - the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru­
dence, perhaps because it resonates with a pro-federalism policy 
agenda.7 
One conservative who is embarrassed by the Eleventh Amend­
ment jurisprudence is Judge John Noonan,8 as revealed in his recent 
monograph, Narrowing the Nation's Power. Judge Noonan comes to 
the topic with impeccable scholarly and conservative credentials. A 
multidegree graduate of Harvard, he served on the law faculties of 
Notre Dame and Boalt Hall, published numerous books and articles 
on religion, ethics, and constitutional law, and was appointed to the 
Ninth Circuit by President Reagan in 1985.9 He is now on senior status 
in that court. Judge Noonan's sharp critique of the Rehnquist Court's 
federalism jurisprudence in general, and the Eleventh Amendment 
cases in particular, has drawn notice and praise in the mainstream 
media. 10 The Senate Judiciary Committee even held a hearing on the 
book. II 
6. Bd. ofTrs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Seminole Tribe of 
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). 
7. As just one example, Kenneth Starr's recent book-length review of the constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court makes only brief mention of the Eleventh Amend­
ment cases. KENNETH w. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS: THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN LIFE 231 (2002). 
8. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
9. For a detailed profile of Judge Noonan, see 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY, at 9th Cir. 79-81 (2003 ed.) (hereinafter 2 ALMANAC]. 
10. E.g., Emily Bazelon, Sounding Off, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2002, at 30; Linda 
Greenhouse, Beyond Original Intent, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002 (Book Review), at 8 
(reviewing Narrowing the Court's Power); Judicial Hypocrisy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2002; 
Power to the State, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2003, at 38 (roundtable discussion of Narrowing the 
Court's Power). 
11. The hearing was convened by Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), and Senators 
Hatch (R-Utah) and Sessions (R-Ala.) attended. Judge Noonan and Cardozo law professor 
Marci Hamilton made presentations. Narrowing the Nation 's Power: The Supreme Court 
Sides with the States: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 07th Cong. (2002) 
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Yet given the enormous, and. mostly critical, scholarly commen­
tary12 on the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases, one must ask what 
Judge Noonan's book adds to the literature, which has been described 
as "not only voluminous but dazzling," and unsurpassed in its "insight, 
elegance, and sophistication . . .  by any similar body of work in all of 
constitutional law."13 This Review answers that question. Part I of the 
Review surveys the tone and substance of Judge Noonan's book. Part 
II discusses conservative legal opinions on the Eleventh Amendment. 
The first two parts are concerned mainly with a formalist critique of 
Eleventh Amendment doctrine, that is, analyzing the cases in light of 
precedent, history, and deductive logic. Drawing on arguments raised 
by Judge Noonan, the third and fourth Parts turn to a more pragmatic 
critique of those cases. Part III considers why the Rehnquist Court has 
seemingly decided so many cases raising Eleventh Amendment issues, 
and suggests that one of the reasons is the activism of state attorneys 
general in aggressively litigating the cases, as parties or amici curiae, in 
the Supreme Court. An empirical study on the states' amicus activity 
in Eleventh Amendment cases is presented there. Part IV revisits ad­
ditional rationales for, and empirical effects of, the Eleventh Amend­
ment cases. With regard to the former, I address whether current 
Eleventh Amendment doctrine has some functional justifications, 
whatever its doctrinal shortcomings. With regard to the latter, I revisit 
the claim of some that there are gaping exceptions to the doctrine that, 
taken with the purported availability of state-law remedies, considera­
bly ameliorate the supposed negative effects of the doctrine on the 
enforcement of federal law. The conclusion briefly outlines an alterna­
tive path the conservative Justices on the Court could have, and 
perhaps should have, taken in shaping Eleventh Amendment doctrine. 
[hereinafter Hearing on Narrowing the Nation's Power] (transcript of hearing on file with 
author). Senator Schumer mentioned that the book came to his attention when he read 
Linda Greenhouse's review in the New York Times. Id. at 1. After praising the book, 
Senator Schumer added that the purpose of the hearing was to explore Judge Noonan's 
ideas on federalism and related issues. Id. at 8. Professor Hamilton had been invited, he 
observed, to "have a worthy co-witness who d
.
oesn't see things quite the same way." Id. 
12. Even a selective listing of the scores of law review articles would take up a lengthy 
footnote. For example, one recent compilation of the literature since 2000 alone listed 
twenty-five articles and three symposia. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND 
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1066-67 n.12 (5th ed. 
2003) [hereinafter HART& WECHSLER]. 
13. John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. 
L. REV. 47, 49 (1998). For further discussion of the scholarship on point, see James E. 
Pfander, Once More Into the Breach: Eleventh Amendment Scholarship and the Court, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (2000). 
1466 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:1463 
I. JUDGE NOONAN'S ARGUMENT 
In addition to being embarrassed, Judge Noonan is not coy about 
his position. In a helpful prologue marked by clear, jargon-free writing 
- as is the balance of the book - he observes that the Court's recent 
federalism cases are at "the center of an explosive package" of 
expanding state sovereign immunity, at the expense of Congressional 
power that results in a federal "right without a remedy" (p. 4). The 
Eleventh Amendment cases are "boldly innovative" (p. 9) because 
they have little connection, he says, to the text or original intent of the 
Amendment. The majority opinions themselves make little attempt, in 
his view, to justify a broad interpretation of the Amendment in light of 
precedent, logic, or practical difficulties of the state defendants. 
As the title of the book reflects, Judge Noonan is concerned with 
the whole federalism j urisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. He spends 
two separate chapters critically examining Morrison v. United States14 
and City of Boerne v. Flores,15 where Court majorities struck down 
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, respectively, as beyond the constitutional 
powers of Congress. But the bulk of the book considers the Eleventh 
Amendment cases.16 
Those cases will be familiar to many readers, and only the briefest 
summary is necessary here.17  The doctrinal story begins with Chisholm 
v. Georgia,18 in 1793, where the Court held that sovereign immunity 
did .not bar a suit in assumpsit by a South Carolina citizen against 
Georgia, as it fell within Article Ill's grant of judicial power over 
controversies "between a State and Citizens of another State."19 With 
a swiftness remarkable for that period or any other, the Eleventh 
14. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
15. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
16. Perhaps curiously, Judge Noonan makes only passing mention, p. 125, of the most 
controversial of the Rehnquist Court's Commerce Clause cases, United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995). Lopez held that a federal law banning a firearm in a school zone went 
beyond Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. Elsewhere he had indicated that 
Lopez was correctly decided. Hearing on Narrowing the Nation's Power, supra note l 1, at 41. 
Principled distinctions can be drawn between cases involving the Commerce Clause and 
those involving the Eleventh Amendment, starting with the text and apparent Framers' 
intent of each clause. So one could be critical of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru­
dence while supportive of the Commerce Clause cases. That said, both lines of cases rely, in 
part, on deference to the record developed by Congress in passing statutes. And in both lines 
of cases, the majority of the Court has usually been nondeferential to congressional judg­
ments (as reflected in the record) as to the need for the legislation. 
17. For fuller discussions of the jurisprudence of the Eleventh Amendment, see HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 973-1066, and LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 367-411 
(2nd ed. 2003). 
18. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
19. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1 .  
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Amendment was passed to overrule that holding within two years.20 
What more, if anything, it was intended to do remains controversial to 
this day. A century later in Hans v. Louisiana,21 the Court held that 
the intent of the Framers, though not conveyed by a literal reading of 
the text, was to bar federal question suits for damages in federal court 
by citizens of a state against that state. 
But several exceptions seemingly blunted the broad ruling in Hans. 
On the same day Hans was decided, the Court held the ruling did not 
apply to suits against political subdivisions of a state.22 During the 
Progressive Era, the Court held in Ex parte Young23 that the Amend­
ment did not bar injunctive relief in federal court when the state offi­
cial was named as the defendant. The Court in the 1970s held that the 
Young exception did not cover injunctive suits against state officials 
that had the effect of a retroactive damage award drawn from the state 
treasury.24 But only two years later, a unanimous Court held in 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer25 that Congress could statutorily abrogate state 
immunity in federal court by passing legislation under Section Five of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Fitzpatrick seems to have been the high-water mark of the expan­
sion of exceptions to a broad reading of the Eleventh Amendment. In 
the 1980s the Court required that Congress clearly state in the text of a 
statute that sovereign immunity was meant to be abrogated.26 At 
the end of that decade a fractured Court held that Congress could 
statutorily abrogate under its Article I powers as well,27 but that was 
overruled in 1996 by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.28 Then the 
Court began to restrict Congress's Section Five power. Building on the 
Boerne case, which did not involve the Eleventh Amendment, the 
Court insisted that the abrogating statute must be based on a legisla-
20. "A constitutional amendment to overrule Chisholm was introduced in the Senate 
only two days after the decision." HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 979. Congress 
approved the amendment less than a year after the decision, and within a year later the 
requisite number of states had approved the amendment. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A 
COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 31, 218 
n.35 (2002). 
21 .  1 34 U.S. l (1890). 
22. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). 
23. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
24. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
25. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
26. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 
U.S. 234 (1985). In earlier cases the Court had suggested, though less explicitly, that congres­
sional statutes should speak with clarity on whether suit against a state was authorized. See 
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 675-77; Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Dep't of 
Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973). 
27. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
28. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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tive record that demonstrates that the remedy created (a private cause 
of action for damages against a state in federal court) is proportionate 
to the injury (state violation of a federal constitutional right embodied 
in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment). On three of four 
occasions the Court has found that abrogating legislation did not meet 
this level of scrutiny, and hence the legislation was found unconstitu­
tional.29 And equally if not more controversially, the majority of 
the Court in Alden v. Maine3° in 1999 held that the penumbra of the 
Eleventh Amendment did not permit Congress to statutorily authorize 
private suit for damages against unconsenting states in state court. 
Judge Noonan tells this story at greater length, though much of it 
will be familiar to experts in the field. Still, he has useful insights and 
nuances to the story. For example, he discusses, and finds wanting, the 
purported Framer's intent cited by the Hans Court. Evidence that 
some of the Framers wished to preserve a broad understanding of 
sovereign immunity (and thus apparently contradicted by Chisholm v. 
Georgia) is best read, he says; as restricted to diversity jurisdiction, not 
federal-question jurisdiction, and as not limiting the power of 
Congress.31 Elsewhere, he notes the "illogic" of Ex parte Young32 -
29. See Bd. ofTrs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Title I of Ameri­
cans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) 
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA'')); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Patent Remedy Act). 
For the 2002 Term, the Court agreed to review two cases that raised Eleventh Amend­
ment challenges to provisions of federal law that authorized a private suit for damages 
against states in federal court. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. 
Ct. 1972 (2003), a six to three majority of the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
private right of action found in the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Fitzpatrick, in my 
view, is still the high-water mark of the Court's expansion of exceptions, even after Hibbs. In 
the latter case, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist (the author of the majority opinions in 
Seminole Tribe and Garrett), the Court scrupulously adheres to the analytical framework of 
the post-Boerne cases. Bill see id. at 1986 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Garrett and 
Kimel "should counsel far more caution than the Court shows in holding [the FLMA provi­
sion) is somehow a congruent and proportional remedy to an identified pattern of discrimi­
nation."). 
The Court also agreed to hear a challenge to Title II of the ADA. See Hason v. Med. Bd. 
of Cal., 279 F.3d 1 167 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted 537 U.S. 1028 (U.S. Nov. 18, 2002) (No. 
02-749). At the request of the petitioner in the case, however, the Court dismissed certiorari. 
123 S. Ct. 1779 (2003). Reportedly, the California Attorney General withdrew the case with­
out having reached a settlement because the case - attacking a provision of the ADA -
turned out to be a political liability. Apparently it was the first time a case before the Court 
had been dismissed by a party, which had successfully obtained certiorari, in the absence of a 
settlement. See Charles Lane, On Second Thought . . .  , WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2003, at A25. 
30. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
31 .  See pp. 66-67, 72-74. Judge Noonan thus seems to fully endorse the "diversity inter­
pretation" of the Amendment. For further discussion of the diversity interpretation, see 
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 983-85; James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: 
An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998); 
and Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2002}. 
For a thorough discussion of the historical context of Hans, concluding that the decision was 
driven, in part, by racist policies of the post-Reconstruction Era, see Edward Purcell, Jr., The 
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the defendant official is a state actor, but is stripped of immunity by 
virtue of being alleged to have violated federal law - and argues that 
the "real irony is that a formal oxymoron should be a cornerstone 
of . . .  jurisprudence."33 But he case can also be regarded as "a master­
ful compromise" (p. 46), permitting plaintiffs to prospectively stop 
unlawful conduct by states but shielding the states from retroactive 
damage relief. Perhaps this "immunity by half," Judge Noonan argues, 
should work the other way around: 
wouldn't it make more sense to say that an ongoing project of the state 
could not be halted by a litigious individual, but if the state was found in 
fact to have violated a constitutional right that it should make up for the 
damage it has caused? That way, you wouldn't let important work be in­
terrupted but the states would be on notice that they would have to pay if 
they were mistaken.34 
Judge Noonan, I think, has this half right. Virtually everyone 
agrees35 that Ex parte Young is illogical and incoherent, yet most 
critics defend Young and attack Hans.36 The latter case may be 
wrongly decided, but its ruling is hardly incoherent. To help make 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence more coherent, if nothing else, 
Young could be overruled. Moreover, Young has shaky jurisprudential 
origins. It was decided only three years after Lochner37 and like that 
case, struck down a piece of state regulation from the Progressive Era. 
Young, much like Lochner,38 was subject to harsh contemporary 
criticism,39 and only gradually achieved iconical status later in the 
Particularly DubiottS Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, History, and the "Federal 
Courts," 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927 (2003). 
32. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
33. P. 47. But see John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent 
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1032 n.325 (2002). 
Ferejohn and Kramer argue that Ex parte Young should not be regarded as a fiction, be­
cause properly understood, sovereign immunity always permitted officials (as opposed to the 
sovereign) to "be sued personally for illegal action taken in their official capacity . . .  [a]ll Ex 
parte Young did was to enlarge this cause of action in a thoroughly conventional manner to 
reflect new activities not already covered by common law". 
34. P. 46 (citing Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, 
Irreparable Injury and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1311 ,  1328-29 (2001)). 
35. Even the Court. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105, 
1 11-14 & n.25 (1984) (describing Young as a "fiction"). 
36. E.g. , Vicki Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential 
Evisceration of Ex Parle Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495 (1997). 
37. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
38. As detailed in Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 
Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 1383 (2001). 
39. There were calls in Congress to statutorily limit or overrule Young, but two years 
later Congress settled on a compromise of sorts, by passing legislation establishing three­
judge district courts. That statute (now codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000)) re­
quired that three federal judges (typically, two district judges and one circuit judge) convene 
to decide whether a request for conjunctive relief under Young should be granted. For dis-
1470 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 101:1463 
twentieth century. Coherence, of course, may not be the only value, 
and perhaps one could live with an incoherent decision to ameliorate a 
badly decided one. So, in hindsight, it can be seen as a "masterful 
compromise."  
On the other hand, Judge Noonan is  less persuasive in suggesting 
that Young ought to be turned around. He suggests forward-looking 
injunctive relief could be prohibited, but retrospective damages relief 
could be permitted. This notion, though, seems wrong. It permits a 
state to continue in violation of constitutional norms, as long as it pays 
off past victims of the conduct. This would have permitted, for 
example, the states in school desegregation cases to continue to run 
segregated schools even after a federal court found them to violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment.40 In contrast, the current Young doctrine 
shields the state from accumulated damages, which might have 
occurred because the state thought, in good faith, that its actions were 
constitutional. It is also more consistent with the asserted concern of 
sovereign immunity to protect the fiscal integrity of states. Expenses 
associated with prospective relief can be budgeted contemporaneously 
with other expenses, while retrospective damages awarded on an ad 
hoc basis presumably cause more havoc for state fiscal planning.41 
Correcting the state for the future while forgiving it for the past seems 
a better compromise (if compromise is necessary) than the other way 
around.42 
· 
In reviewing the more recent cases, Judge Noonan finds them 
unduly restrictive of congressional power and a "present danger to the 
exercise of democratic government" (p. 140). For example, he 
observes that Congress is in a better position than the Court to meas­
ure proportionality, and that the Court's insistence on a seemingly 
massive record of state violation of federal law ignores the fact that 
Congress does not irrationally rely on anecdotes in law making (pp. 
146-48). Ultimately, Judge Noonan argues for a "middle ground,"43 a 
cussion of the immediate reaction to Young, see OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF 
THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 218-21 (1993), and Michael E. Solimine, The Three­
J11dge District Co11rt in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 83-84 (1996). 
For discussion of the subsequent effect of Young on federal courts jurisprudence, see 
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE 
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 43-45 (2000), and 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE§ 4231 (2d ed. 1 988). 
40. For an argument positing such a scheme, see DERRICK BELL. FACES AT THE 
BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 47-64 (1992). 
41 .  A point suggested, albeit briefly, by the Court in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 
666 n.11 (1974). 
42. I am particularly indebted to Ann Althouse for her insightful comments on several 
of the points raised here, and elsewhere, in this Review. 
43. Pp. 83, 119. As he observes, pp. 82-83, the term appears in Alexander Hamilton's 
discussion of sovereign immunity in THE FEDERALIST No. 81. 
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term he employs but does not precisely define. We can infer, I think, 
that he prefers some literal interpretation of the Amendment, but can 
live with the status quo as it existed until Boerne: a broad interpreta­
tion of the Amendment, coupled with broad exceptions, including 
recognition of a robust congressional power (under Section Five if 
nothing else) to abrogate the immunity .44 
Another point Noonan does not entirely make clear is its intended 
audience. As noted, the book is useful but not especially revelatory to 
experts on federal courts. But that's a relatively small group, and 
Judge Noonan's helpful exposition of this area of law is probably most 
intended for academics and policymakers not steeped in the arcana of 
federal jurisdiction. The text, in a reader-friendly font, is only 156 
pages, with 36 pages of endnotes, where he cites relevant portions of 
the considerable academic literature. Rather than relying on mundane 
narrative, Judge Noonan sets out large parts of his discussion as an 
exchange between a hypothetical federal judge and his law clerks. He 
also enlivens the discussion by telling us, though not at excessive 
length, about the parties and attorneys45 involved in the cases. His tone 
44. There is considerable support for Judge Noonan's position that the recent federal­
ism cases are based on an unrealistic conception of the congressional lawmaking process, 
and unfairly impose new standards of review upon statutes passed prior to Boerne. See A. 
Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court"s 
New "On the Record'' Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328 
(2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 87 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 
(2001) ;  Phillip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and 
the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 1 1 1  YALE L.J. 1707 (2002). But see Neal 
Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 
50 DUKE L.J. 1 169 (2001) (arguing that due to interest group pressures and other reasons, 
Congress's superior fact-finding capability, as compared to the Courts, often is not fully 
brought to bear on legislation). The critical literature may need to be revised in light of 
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003), in which the 
majority, in the course of upholding a challenged provision of the FMLA, carefully and at 
length examined the legislative record built up over several years in Congress, prior to the 
passage of the law in 1993. Id. at 1978-81. 
As an example of what he regards as the pernicious "impact of the Boerne criteria on the 
federal system," p. 100, Judge Noonan points out that not only the Supreme Court, but a 
three-judge Court of Appeals panel or a sole district judge, can "function as the censor of 
Congress," p. 100, by closely examining the record before Congress in these cases. I don't 
see how that point is related to his substantive criticism of the Boerne criteria. Under any 
standard of review, any Article III judge at any level of the federal system (and indeed state 
court judges) is empowered to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. 
45. P. 35 (mentioning counsel for both sides in Boerne); p. 62 (mentioning counsel in 
Chisholm v. Georgia). A quite different discussion of counsel appears in one of the recent 
articles sharply critical of the recent Eleventh Amendment cases. Sylvia A. Law, In the 
Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. 
C!N. L. REV. 367 (2002). There, Professor Law, while discussing a federal district court deci­
sion upholding a state's Eleventh Amendment challenge to a portion of the Medicaid laws, 
points out that the judge sua sponte invited Ohio attorney Jeffrey Sutton to argue that issue. 
Id. at 393. Sutton, as Law tells us, successfully argued for the state in Garrett, is a member of 
the Federalist Society, and has been nominated to the Sixth Circuit by President Bush. Id. at 
393-94. She does not state why these facts are relevant to her discussion of the issue at hand. 
As best as I can tell, she does not reveal counsels' identity or backgrounds in the other cases 
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throughout, almost without exception,46 is measured and objective, 
making it a model of academic discourse on the Eleventh Amend­
ment, or any other topic. 
II. CONSERVATIVES AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Judge Noonan's book gained attention in some quarters47 because 
the author was a presumed conservative criticizing the putative 
conservative federalism decisions of five members of the Court. The 
apparent apostasy of Judge Noonan was hard to ignore. But these 
characterizations beg the question of what is, or should be, a conser­
vative critique of the Eleventh Amendment. 
Richard Fallon recently revisited this issue.48 He acknowledges that 
the " 'conservative' label is easier to apply than to define," and that 
"the relationship between a commitment to constitutional federalism 
and other conservative values is by no means always obvious. "49 
Nonetheless, he sketches out several aspects of judicial federalism in 
this context. One dimension is substantive conservatism, which gener­
ally means disfavor of many civil-liberties and civil-rights claims, and 
suspicion of government regulation except when used to protect 
"traditional values and structures."50 Another dimension is methodo­
logical conservatism, which generally favors forms of originalism and 
textualism in interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions, 
coupled with respect for precedent and the desire to change precedent 
in only small, incremental steps.51 A final dimension is institutional 
conservatism, which often favors a strong presidency, is suspicious of 
she discusses. Cf Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., Devil's Advocates: The Danger of 
Judging Lawyers by Their Clients, POL'Y REV., Feb. & Mar. 2002, at 15 (arguing that for a 
variety of reasons, judicial nominees, and lawyers in general, should not be judged on the 
identity of their clients or on the arguments, however unpopular, they make on behalf of 
clients). Sutton was confirmed by the Senate in April of 2003. 
46. Admirably, Judge Noonan eschews efforts to engage in "psychobiography" of the 
Justices, and for the most part does not focus on or name particular Justices. P. 8. Nor does 
he discuss or speculate on the presumed policy or ideological agendas of the Justices. At one 
point, however, while discussing Kimel, involving the ADEA, he mentions in passing that 
almost all of the Justices are older, but are protected from job discrimination by their Article 
III status. P. 112. Of course that's true, but it does little to advance the discussion to mention 
the personal characteristics of the Justices. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC 
INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE 49-50 (2001) (discussing situations when ad 
hominem arguments may be appropriate). 
47. See, e.g. , Greenhouse, supra note 10. 
48. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism 
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002). 
49. Id. at 434. 
50. Id. at 447. As Fallon points out, these categories are "crude" and "[s]elf-identified 
political conservatives include both libertarians . . .  and social conservatives," id., who often 
take different positions on the propriety of government regulation in various contexts. 
51. Id. at 448-50. 
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federal legislative power, and seeks to protect the prerogatives of state 
and local government, vis-a-vis the national government.s2 
According to Fallon, the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru­
dence does not fare well under the lens of methodological conserva­
tism. The expansive interpretation of the Amendment in Hans, he 
says, finds little support in the constitutional text or the original 
understanding of the Framers.s3 Moreover, the recent· cases have 
expansively interpreted Hans itself54 and have aggressively overturned 
precedent.ss From originalism premises, Fallon finds the diversity 
interpretation the best reading of the Amendment.s6 
Fallon's views are reflected in the writings of conservatives7 legal 
scholars on the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Several 
writers forthrightly defend the expansion of sovereign immunity on 
the originalist grounds advanced by the Hans Court.ss Several other 
writers, unconvinced by that reading of the Framers' intent, and 
discomfited by the tension between Hans and the text, advance other 
52. Id. at 450-51. For a similar catalog of conservative legal thought, see Ernest A 
Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1182-1203 
(2002). 
53. Fallon, supra note 48, at 481. 
54. As Fallon, and others, point out, the Hans opinion is not without ambiguities, and is 
arguably susceptible to a narrow reading that establishes a broad reach of state sovereign 
immunity as a matter of federal common law only, thus permitting it to be abrogated by any 
congressional power. Id. at 481-82. The Court majority has all but rejected that narrower 
reading. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 79-80 (2000); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68 (1996). 
55. Fallon, supra note 48, at 482. The charge that the majorities in the recent Eleventh 
Amendmen·t cases have eagerly overturned precedent seems overdrawn. While Seminole 
Tribe overruled Union Gas, see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text, the latter case was 
only seven years old, and few have made the effort to defend the result in Union Gas. Cf 
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 33, at 1032 n.328 (stating that Union Gas ".must stand as one 
of the Court's all-time most tortured and poorly reasoned opinions"). On the other hand, the 
dissenters frequently call for Hans and more recent cases (like Seminole Tribe) to be over­
ruled. E.g. , Kimel, 528 U.S. at 97-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
56. Fallon, supra note 48, at 443-44. 
57. Here and elsewhere in this Review, I use the term "conservative" to mean scholars 
that, by my reading, generally take positions on federal-court issues that most would regard 
as examples of conservative legal thought. I agree with Fallon that crude ideological labels 
are difficult to define precisely, and should only be used with caution. 
58. E.g., David P. Currie, Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 
(1997); Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485 
(2001). Indeed, so convinced is Professor Hill of the constitutional basis of Hans that he 
argues Fitzpatrick was wrongly decided. Id. at 529-31. In a similar vein, one group has filed 
amicus briefs in recent Eleventh Amendment cases advising the Court to overrule Fitz­
patrick or Ex parte Young, on the basis that those decisions are inconsistent with Hans. See 
Brief Amicus Curiae of Coalition For Local Sovereignty in Support of Petitioner at 2-26, Bd. 
ofTrs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-1240) (arguing Fitzpatrick 
should be overruled); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Coalition For Local Sovereignty in support 
of the Respondent at 7, Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (No. 98-0791) 
(arguing Young should be overruled). 
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originalist or textual interpretations.59 Still other conservative writers 
seem to vaguely approve of Hans and more recent decisions, but by 
my reading make little extended effort to defend Hans and its progeny 
on originalist grounds.60 
To be sure, conservative writers have not cornered the market on 
abandoning preferred interpretational methodologies when it might 
appear, to the outside observer, to be convenient for policy reasons. 
Many liberal critics of the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases insist 
the cases are wrongly decided on originalist grounds. Yet they often 
argue against originalism when interpreting other provisions of the 
Constitution, and are not embarrassed by abandoning the constitu­
tional text in those situations.61 
In his book, Judge Noonan does not label his critique as a "conser­
vative" one, and indeed it is difficult to force his analysis into the 
traditional categories of that ideology.62 He is conversant with 
59. E.g. , John C. Eastman, A Seminole Dissent?, l GEO. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 29 (2002) 
(arguing that the majority in Seminole Tribe misinterpreted the Framers' views on sovereign 
immunity); Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law 
and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027 (2002) (arguing the Framers intended to 
incorporate international law notions of sovereignty); Robert A. Levy, When State Dignity 
Trumps Individual Rights, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW: 2001-2002, at 31 (2002) 
(arguing the Eleventh Amendment ought to be interpreted narrowly and literally, and that 
federal power should be reined in directly, rather than relying on sovereign immunity); Cal­
vin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 61 (1989) (advocating a literal reading but arguing that Hans and its progeny would be 
better grounded in the Tenth Amendment); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine 
of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559 (2002) (revisiting Framers' intent of both 
Article III and the Eleventh Amendment, and arguing that the Amendment is better under­
stood as granting a new kind of immunity akin to personal jurisdiction, not as codifying sov­
ereign immunity); Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The 
Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 
NW. U. L. REV. 819 (1999) (revisiting the historical meaning of the word "State" in the 
Eleventh Amendment and elsewhere in the Constitution). 
60. See, e.g., MICHAEL s. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, How IT 
COULD HAPPEN 66-76 (1999); ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 60-62 (2001); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Eleventh Amendment, Garrett, and 
Protection for Civil Rights, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1183 (2002); cf Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism 
and the RehnquLft Court: A Normative Defense, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI., Mar. 
2001, at 24, 26 (defending Court's federalism decisions, but leaving detailed defense of 
sovereign immunity decisions "for another day"). 
61. To their credit, some liberal critics of sovereign immunity acknowledge the inconsis­
tency. See Law, supra note 45, at 421-25; Jed Rubenfeld, The New Unwritten Constitution, 51 
DUKE L.J. 289, 293-95 (2001). For an empirical study demonstrating that none of the Justices 
are fully consistent in utilizing textual and originalism arguments presented by litigants in 
their briefs, see Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 
L. & SOC'Y REV. 113 (2002). 
62. Perhaps this is reflective of his reputation as an unpredictable conservative on the 
bench. 2 ALMANAC, s11pra note 9, at 75. 
Admirably, he also eschews the epithet of "activism" when discussing the cases, arguing 
that the term "should be banished from the political lexicon." P. 9. That term has degener­
ated from overuse in legal discourse and now signals little more than that the user disagrees 
with the decision. For an extensive and helpful discussion .of this point, see Young, supra 
note 52, at 1141-81. Nonetheless, to the extent the term "judicial activism" is a coherent con-
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methodological conservatism, as he is critical of the recent cases on 
originalist grounds (p. 9). On the other hand, he seemingly breaks with 
institutional conservatism by his frequent calls for more Court defer­
ence to Congress, particularly regarding that institution's Section Five 
powers. Thus, it seems an oversimplification at best to label, as has 
been done,63 Judge Noonan's book as a mainstream conservative 
critique. It simply doesn't fall neatly into either conservative or liberal 
camps. To my mind, that is a compliment, not an insult. Moreover, 
Judge Noonan addresses functionalist arguments for the results of the 
Eleventh Amendment cases, which adds to the literature and which I 
address below. 
III. ACTIVISM BY ST ATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND ELEVENTH 
AMENDMENT LITIGATION 
Presumably, Judge Noonan would not have written Narrowing the 
Nation's Power if the Supreme Court had not decided an abundance 
of Eleventh Amendment cases. One of the critics of that jurispru­
dence, Larry Kramer, has lamented that the Court has decided "a 
seemingly neverending succession of cases defining, upholding, pro­
tecting, or extending the sovereign immunity of the states."64 Why the 
Court has undertaken to decide so many cases, and why it has been 
given the opportunity to do so, has been little discussed in the vast 
literature on the Eleventh Amendment. 
Attempting to answer these questions has both demand and supply 
sides. The Supreme Court, through its discretionary certiorari jurisdic­
tion, controls the demand side. The Court's exercise of this discretion 
has attracted the attention of legal scholars and social scientists, as the 
Court rarely states why it has decided, or not decided, to review a par­
ticular case. Scholars have examined a variety of variables (such as the 
filing of amicus briefs, the presence of repeat players like the United 
States Government, or the ideological direction of the holding sought 
to be reviewed) to glean some systematic patterns.65 More recently, 
cept, Professor Young observes that Chisholm v. Georgia, championed by critics of the 
modem cases, "was considered an outrageous act of judicial activism in 1793." Id. at 1170. 
Moreover, he continues, "the most widely criticized aspect of the Court's federalism juris­
prudence - the state sovereign immunity cases - are clearly not activist in the sense of 
being a major break with the past. . . .  That does not mean that the Court's present cases are 
rightly decided." Id. at 1172 n.129. 
63. E.g., Stuart H. Shiffman, Strong Words for the Court, 86 JUDICATURE 214, 214 
(2003). 
64. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term - Foreword: We The Court, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 145 (2001) (internal citation omitted); see also Fallon, supra note 48, at 
481 (wondering why "the Court devote[s] so much energy to refining and incrementally 
expanding" Eleventh Amendment doctrine). 
65. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 78-83 (1997); 
H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
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attention has focused on the Court's diminishing caseload during 
much of the last decade.66 
So far as I can tell, this literature has not focused on the Eleventh 
Amendment cases. And the Court itself has not provided much 
guidance (any more than it does in other cases), only blandly indicat­
ing on occasion that certiorari was granted to resolve a circuit split.67 
Yet, it is striking that the Court has taken up these cases at a regular 
rate, when the docket shrank to about eighty-five cases per term in the 
early 1990s.68 On the other hand, as Judge Noonan noted,69 the Solici­
tor General often intervenes in these cases as litigant or amicus to 
defend the constitutionality of the statute. It is well documented that 
the presence of the United States in these capacities makes it more 
likely that the Court will review the case.70 
By my count, the Court decided thirty-six Eleventh Amendment 
cases from 1964 to 2002, with twenty-one and eight of those being 
decided from 1990 and 2000 to the present, respectively.71 Only a little 
SUPREME COURT (1991). For a brief review of the literature, see Tracey E. George & Mi­
chael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeal En Banc, 
9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 174-75 (2001). 
66. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's Ple­
nary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737 (2001); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken 
Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403. 
67. E.g. , Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1976 (2003); Lapides v. 
Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 618 (2002); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356, 363 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 712 (1999); cf Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 
743, 751 (2002) (simply repeating the legal issue on which certiorari was granted); Vermont 
Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 770 (2000) 
(same); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53 (1996) (same). 
68. Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First 
Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 353 (2002) (listing Court cases decided on merits from 1989 to 
1999 Terms). 
69. Pp. 35, 116. The statute permitting intervention as a party is 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) 
(2000). For discussion on the Solicitor General's role in the Eleventh Amendment context, 
see Seth P. Waxman, Foreword: Does the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 
1 120-21 (2001). 
70. George & Solimine, supra note 65, at 189. But see Waxman, supra note 69, at 1120 
(suggesting that Solicitor General's influence has been diminished in federalism cases due to 
the availability of private rights of action in which "counsel will press even weak cases to the 
next highest court," interest groups now plan litigation and thus diminish the uniqueness of 
the government strategically litigating cases, and statutes now subject to constitutional chal­
lenge were often "not carefully crafted and justified in the legislative record"); Suzanna 
Sherry, Irresponsibility Breeds Contempt, 6 GREEN BAG (2d ser.) 47 (2002) (making similar 
points). 
71. A list of the cases is found in the Appendix to this Review. I gleaned the cases from 
standard secondary sources, i.e., casebooks and hornbooks. The list is composed .of fully 
argued cases where a substantive or procedural Eleventh Amendment issue was resolved on 
the merits. Thus, I excluded cases which were summarily decided by the Court, e.g. , 
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam), and cases where an Eleventh Amend­
ment issue was noted but not decided because it had been advanced for the first time only on 
appeal. E.g. , Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1998); Patsy v. Bd. 
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over one-half (nineteen) of the cases were brought to the Court by a 
litigant asserting a sovereign-immunity defense, and these litigants 
were usually represented by the attorney general of that state. But 
that percentage underestimates the activity of the state attorneys gen­
eral on this topic. It is well-documented that state attorneys general 
have become more active and professionalized in a wide range of 
contexts.72 And more relevant to our purposes, over the last two 
decades, state attorneys general have been more active in preparing 
for and litigating cases at the Supreme Court level, as well as in filing 
amicus briefs.73 
Data regarding the amici activity of state attorneys general are 
presented in this Review's Appendix.74 Until the 1990s, the amicus 
activity of states in these cases was sporadic. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,75 
of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n.19 (1982). On the other hand, I included cases that involved 
claims brought in state court, and thus are not strictly speaking covered by the Eleventh 
Amendment, but nonetheless are resolved by principles derived from Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence. See Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002); Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). I excluded Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 
58 (1989), however, because the holding of that case - that neither States nor state officials 
acting in their official capacities are "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - did not directly rely 
on Eleventh Amendment doctrine, though that doctrine was discussed. 
Regarding the distribution of these cases. Dan Meltzer has observed that the Eleventh 
Amendment was only cited in ten Warren Court decisions, over sixteen Terms. Daniel J. 
Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1. 
Only the first of the cases in the Appendix is from the Warren Era. Meltzer further observed 
that the first and second editions of Hart & Wechsler's casebook on federal courts, pub­
lished in 1953 and 1973, respectively, had less than eleven pages on the Eleventh Amend­
ment. Id. at 1-2. In contrast, the fifth edition of the casebook has 93 pages on the Amend­
ment. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 973-1066. 
72. See generally ERIC N. W ALTENBURG & BILL SWINFORD, LITIGATING FEDERALISM: 
THE STATES BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 43-56 (1999); Cornell W. Clayton, Law, 
Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as National Policymakers, 56 REV. 
POL. 525 (1994); Leonard Ray & Rorie L. Spill, The States in Federal Appellate Court: 
Litigation Trends Over Time, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 97 (2002); Joseph F. Zimmerman, Interstate 
Cooperation: The Roles of the State Attorneys General, 28 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 71 
(Winter 1998); Russell Gold & Andrew Caffrey, United Crime Busters: Chasing Bad Guys 
Together, State Attorneys General Join Forces to Win Cases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2002, at Bl. 
73. See WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 72, at 57-79 (describing increase of liti­
gation activity in the Supreme Court by state attorneys general); Clayton, supra note 72, at 
542-48 (describing how the National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG") in 1982 
set up a Supreme Court Project to coordinate and professionalize various litigation activity 
before the Court). Further information about NAAG's Supreme Court Project can be found 
at the NAAG website, http://www.naag.org/issues/issue-supreme_court.php (last visited Oct. 
8, 2003). 
74. A recent, definitive empirical study of amicus filings in the Supreme Court used as 
the database the listing of such briefs provided on the U.S. Reports by the Court's Reporter 
of Decisions, Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiea 
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 835-43 (2000) (describing methodology 
of study), and I did the same. Aside from the ease of using this information, the "Reporter's 
office has a deserved reputation for meticulousness," id. at 839, and past researchers have 
expressed confidence in the completeness of the information provided by the Reporter, in­
cluding the indication of what position, if any, the amicus brief was advocating. Id. at 839-40. 
75. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
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decided in 1976, twenty-two states joined in an amicus brief in favor of 
the state defendant. But as late as 1991, there were cases in which no 
states appeared as amici in favor of the party advocating the Eleventh 
Amendment defense. That changed in the past decade. Twenty to 
forty states began joining in one or more amicus briefs76 in favor of the 
sovereign-immunity position. In all cases but one, all of the states sup­
ported the Eleventh Amendment defense. The one exception was 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,77 which 
involved Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 
There, seven states supported Alabama but fourteen states argued as 
amici against the Eleventh Amendment defense. Reportedly, over 
twenty states had originally agreed to file amicus briefs in support of 
Alabama, but eventually advocates of disability rights persuaded many 
of those states to change their position.78 
To be sure, this state amicus activity79 may be little more than 
symbolic politics. The filing of amicus briefs by all litigants in the 
Supreme Court has been rising,80 and state attorneys general have 
increasingly filed such briefs in many other cases.81 It is not clear how 
76. In recent cases state attorneys general have been coordinating their amici activity, 
and joining in one or two briefs, as opposed to each state filing its own brief. WALTENBURG 
& SWINFORD, supra note 72, at 70-75; Cornell W. Clayton & Jack McGuire, State Litigation 
Strategies and Policymaking in the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 22-25 
(2001). 
77. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
78. Marci A. Hamilton, Why Federalism Must Be Enforced: A Response to Professor 
Kramer, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1069, 1083 (2001). Hamilton goes on to say that the "threat of 
making the politicians in those states appear as though they were opposed to the disabled 
was sufficient to move those politicians from a position of principle on behalf of their states 
to a position of silence." Id. For a similar example, see Douglas v. California Dep't of Youth 
Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 821 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (California attorney general waived Eleventh 
Amendment defense in an ADA case, even after Garrett). See also supra note 29 (describing 
litigation strategy of California Attorney General in Hason litigation). 
A similar situation is evidenced by the amici activity in the case in the 2002 Term, Ne­
vada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003), involving the FMLA. 
See Linda Greenhouse, In Family Leave Case, Supreme Court Steps Back Into Federalism 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12. 2003, at 23 (fourteen and six states filed amicus briefs support­
ing and opposing the sovereign-immunity position, respectively). 
79. There are other aspects of state amicus activity in Eleventh Amendment cases that 
are beyond the scope of this Review. For example, one could further examine amicus activ­
ity in the lower federal courts or in state courts, amicus activity at the certiorari stage in the 
Supreme Court, or the content of the arguments presented in the amicus briefs. 
As the Appendix indicates, there are also other interest groups appearing as amici in 
these cases who advance the interest of the states. Thus, the Council of State Governments 
and the National Conference of State Legislatures filed amicus briefs in eight and four cases, 
respectively. 
80. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 74, at 753 (percentage of cases with one or more 
amicus briefs filed rose from 23% in the 1940s to over 80% by 1995). 
81. Id. at 753 n.25 (state amicus briefs rose from 4% of cases in 1940s to about 30% by 
1995); see Clayton & McGuire, supra note 76, at 21-22 (similar data). 
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much impact all of these briefs have on the Court's decisionmaking.82 
Judge Noonan is aware of amicus activity, as he mentions in passing 
that advocacy groups for the disabled filed amicus briefs in favor of 
the ADA in Garrett (p. 116). He doesn't mention the briefs filed by 
the state in that case. More interesting for examining the activism of 
state attorneys general is Judge Noonan's reference to Morrison v. 
United States,83 where the majority of the Court struck down as uncon­
stitutional prov1s1ons of the Violence Against Women Act 
("VA WA"). Echoing the observations of a dissent in that case - that 
thirty-six state attorneys general filed. an amicus brief in support of 
VA WA84 - Judge Noonan argues that the "irony of championing the 
autonomy of the state sovereigns when they did not appear to want it 
was palpable" (p. 135). But there is a further irony in giving weight to 
state attorneys general in Morrison, but not in the Eleventh Amend­
ment context. If state amicus activity should be given jurisprudential 
weight in federalism cases, it ought to do the same in sovereign­
immunity cases - the theory should be applied evenhandedly. 
IV. PRAGMATISM AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Much of the Eleventh Amendment case law is highly formalist in 
its reasoning. For example, as Judge Noonan observes (p. 154), the 
Court has spoken of the states' "dignity" fostered by the Amend­
ment.85 Yet formalism has characterized much, though not all,86 
academic writing on the topic as well. In particular, much of that 
writing has avoided serious discussion of the practical consequences of 
the decisions. One of the strengths of Judge Noonan's book is that he 
does expressly grapple with such pragmatic issues. 
82. For a thorough discussion of this issue, though it does not focus on the Eleventh 
Amendment cases, see Kearney & Merrill, supra note 74. 
83. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
84. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 653 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
85. E.g. , Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 
(2002); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999). 
86. For some exceptions, see Ann Althouse, When to Believe a Legal Fiction: Federal 
Interests and the Eleventh Amendment, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1 123 (1989) (arguing that Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence should be shaped by practical consideration of the federal inter­
ests at stake, not by legal fictions and obtuse historical debates); Melvyn R. Durchslag, 
Should Political Subdivisions Be Accorded Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 43 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 577 (1994) (discussing functionalist reasons for making a distinction between states and 
their political subdivisions); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as a Curb on 
Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1225 (2001) (arguing that insulating states from li­
ability for damages permits states greater control over their bureaucracies); Todd E. Pettys, 
Competing for the People's Affection: Federalism's Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 
329 (2003) (defending Eleventh Amendment cases as facilitating healthy competition be­
tween the federal and state governments); and Pfander, supra note 13, at 826-31 (discussing 
Eleventh Amendment scholarship that explicitly or implicitly considers functionalist issues). 
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Consider first practical rationales for the decisions. On some occa­
sions the Court has moved beyond formalism and advanced function­
alist justifications for the broad interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment. Thus, for example, the Court has spoken of the need to 
protect the financial integrity of the states to enable them to provide 
goods and services to their citizens.87 Cognizant of the small body of 
academic literature discussing functionalist rationales,88 Judge Noonan 
finds the proposition unpersuasive. As he observes, the Court cites no 
empirical data for the fiscal integrity argument.89 Judge Noonan makes 
the provocative and convincing point that if the Amendment's shield 
was really necessary, one would expect to see states paying higher 
interest rates on bonds they issue. Since states, unlike political subdivi­
sions, cannot be sued in federal court if they default on bonds, the 
distinction should be reflected in the interest rate for such bonds. The 
bond market reflects no such difference: "A city, a county, a state 
agency, a state - they'll all give about the same return."90 
87. Alden, 527 U.S. at 750; see also Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 
1972 (2003) (rejecting Eleventh Amendment challenge to provision of FMLA creating pri­
vate right, in part, given that Congress placed limits on its scope, including various restric­
tions on damages awardable). 
As has been observed, e.g .. Durchslag, supra note 86, at 604-05, some earlier Eleventh 
Amendment cases spoke in functionalist terms, at least in part, see, e.g. , Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U.S. 678, 691-92 & n.18 (1978) (finding that attorneys' fee award against state would not 
interfere "with the State's budgeting process"); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & 
Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973) (making distinction 
between nonprofit and proprietary functions of a state), but most of the cases eschew such 
analysis. 
88. P. 170 (discussing Hills, supra note 86). 
89. To be fair, it appears that in their briefing in Eleventh Amendment cases, neither 
the state parties nor the amici supporting the state position consistently spend time sup­
porting the fiscal integrity argument. For example, by my reading, none of the briefs in 
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), explicitly cited any data supporting 
arguments that the state's fiscal integrity would be undermined by permitting ADEA suits 
against states. On the other hand, several of the briefs in Board of Trustees of the University 
of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) did expressly address such matters regarding 
ADA suits against states. See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Hawaii et al., in Support of 
Petitioners at 18-27, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-
1240) (detailing high costs of various ADA suits brought against states); Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Association of State Correctional Administrators in Support of Petitioners at 9-10, 
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-1240) (same, with 
regard to ADA suits brought by prisoners). 
90. Pp. 56, 58; see also p. 59 ("As for [Eleventh Amendment] immunity, you could count 
on one hand the number of bond traders who've heard of it."). 
No doubt the market considers a large number of factors in setting an interest rate for 
bonds issued by a state, as opposed to those issued by political subdivisions or others. For 
example, one factor that might suggest lower interest rates for state bonds is that most states 
are larger and have more taxing power than the typical political subdivision. Thus, the Elev­
enth Amendment bar to suit may only play the limited role of counteracting such market 
pressures. Since states cannot print their own money, "they operate in private credit markets 
just like private borrowers. These markets themselves, through the determination of credit 
ratings and other forms of monitoring fiscal performance, create an environment in which 
the fiscal authorities must behave in responsible ways." Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fis­
cal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, ll39 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
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Perhaps Judge Noonan should have stopped there, for some of his 
other arguments are less compelling. Pointing out that sovereign 
immunity bars damage relief "for real injuries committed by a state," 
he asks "why should a state tortfeasor not pay compensation for the 
injury it inflicts?" (p. 154). The short answer is that a state is institu­
tionally different from other tortfeasors, such as private individuals or 
corporations. Governments do not easily respond to market incentives 
and, for example, may not . internalize costs in the same way as a pri­
vate firm. While we generally permit the market to govern the finan­
cial viability of private tortfeasors, bankruptcy is not a good option for 
a state. States provide a panoply of goods and services that may not be 
provided by the market, and face a variety of political obstacles not 
faced by private parties in order to raise revenue to pay for all of that 
(including money judgments). It does not necessarily follow that the 
state should never be treated like a private tortfeasor, but it suggests 
that limiting damage awards (as opposed to, say, injunctive relief) is 
not irrational.91 
Judge Noonan also suggests that states do not "need an extra 
dollop of security" provided by the Eleventh Amendment since "fed­
eral law will be shaped by members of Congress not insensitive to the 
protection of their home states" (p. 56). This remark enters the debate 
on whether there are "political safeguards of federalism,"92 enforced 
by Congress with which the federal courts should not interfere. There 
is extensive academic debate over whether and to what extent such 
political safeguards exist and the implications for judicial protection of 
Despite the bar to recovery in litigation if states default on their bonds, states have 
significant incentives to pay their bonds. In particular, states (and other sovereigns that issue 
debt) presumably seek to maintain their reputation as good credit risks, so as not to be 
excluded from future borrowing. William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Re­
structuring and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) 
(manuscript on file with author). In this environment, the Eleventh Amendment bar to suit 
probably has little direct effect on the bond market interest rate. See Christopher Shortell, 
The Hidden Costs of Protection: State Sovereign Immunity and Harm to States (unpub­
lished paper, presented at 2003 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Pol. Sci. Ass'n, Chicago, IJI., 
on file with author) (studying certain states evading payment of debts in 1840s, through bar 
of sovereign immunity; concluding that those states had difficulty in reentering capital 
markets, and Jed to adoption of restrictions in state constitutions to borrowing authority). 
91. For further discussion of the issues raised in this paragraph, see Mark R. Brown, 
Deterring Bully Government: A Sovereign Dilemma, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1 49 (2001); Daryl J. 
Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional 
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000); and Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Gov­
ernment-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980). For 
application to the Eleventh Amendment context, see Adam Feibelman, Federal Bankruptcy 
Law and State Sovereign Immunity, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 1381 (2003). 
92. See the seminal article, Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: 
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
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state prerogatives.93 An exhaustive review of that debate is unneces­
sary here. Suffice it to say that if one accepts some version of the 
political-safeguards argument, as Judge Noonan and some dissenters 
in the recent Eleventh Amendment cases appear to do,94 it follows that 
expansive interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment are inappro­
priate or at the very least Congress should enjoy wide power to statu­
torily abrogate the immunity. At least in the Eleventh Amendment 
arena, though, the predicate for that argument is at least debatable. 
For over two decades, it seems, Congress has frequently enacted 
statutes creating private causes of action against states for damages in 
federal court.95 More to the point, it seems difficult to conclude 
Congress has been engaged on the issue of state sovereign immunity, 
other than to pass laws abrogating it.96 
93. For a sampling of the extensive literature, see Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards 
Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951 (2001); Lynn A. Baker 
& Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 
75 (200 1); Hamilton, supra note 78; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Po­
litical Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); and John C. Yoo, The Ju­
dicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997). For a review and critique of 
the literature, see Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 8-12 
(2002), and Paul Frymer & Albert Yoon, Political Parties, Representation, and Federal Safe­
g11ards, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 977 (2002). 
94. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 93 (2000) (Stevens, J., concur­
ring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Wechsler, supra note 92). 
95. See Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses 
to Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAW. 301 (1988); Meltzer, 
supra note 71, at 32; Pfander, supra note 13, at 826-27. In Alden v. Maine, the majority ob­
served that the Federal Employers Liability Act, passed in the early 1900s, apparently was 
the first law to subject states to private actions, but that such statutes "multiplied" in the 
1960s and beyond. 527 U.S. 706, 744 (1999). The Court added that the passage of such stat­
utes "in the last generation," id. , was "perhaps inspired by Parden and Union Gas," id. at 
745. These two rulings found congressional power to abrogate sovereign immunity. This sug­
gestion seems plausible but, to my knowledge, has not been addressed in depth in the 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. See also infra note 110 (discussing similar theories 
about how Congress has legislated in light of Hans). 
96. In the considerable literature on the political-safeguards model, there is relatively 
little direct discussion of Eleventh Amendment issues, so further empirical research on that 
point would be beneficial. For example, Evan Caminker has argued that the political­
safeguards model should include the possibility of private businesses joining states in lobby­
ing on sovereign immunity issues, since the federal Jaws in question typically regulate both 
public and private entities. Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on 
Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1 127, 1189 n.261 (2001). For a study of such joint lobby­
ing, albeit not focusing on Eleventh Amendment issues, see Michael S. Greve, Business, the 
States, and Federalism 's Political Economy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 895 (2002). See also 
Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining Why Senate Democrats Can Tolerate 
Rehnquist Court Decision Making B11t Not The Rehnquist Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1307 
(2002) (arguing that Congress has rarely responded to the recent Eleventh Amendment and 
other federalism cases, which struck down federal statutes, in whole or in part, because the 
decisions usually leave open alternative avenues for the enforcement of federal law, and 
most lawmakers and interest groups rarely focus on federalism issues as such); John Dinan, 
Congressional Responses to the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, PUBLIUS: THE J. OF 
FEDERALISM, Summer 2002, at 1 (making similar points). 
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Consider next the effects of Eleventh Amendment cases. For some 
time majority opinions in these cases, even while holding that a private 
plaintiff was unable to pursue a damage claim in federal court, took 
pains to observe that at least in theory, the plaintiffs could pursue 
relief in state courts under federal or state law, or that federal rights 
could be enforced in other ways (e.g., through injunctive relief or in 
actions by the federal govemment).97 These observations, at one time 
thought to be of some doctrinal significance,98 are now probably little 
more than rhetorical flourish to ameliorate anticipated criticism of 
holdings.99 Of course, states can still consent to suit in their own courts. 
But how effective are the remedies voluntarily allowed by a state? No 
doubt the answer will vary from state to state and from topic to topic, 
but Judge Noonan is not sanguine.100 Though he doesn't discuss the 
point at length, his pessimism seems justified. For example, recent 
studies of the scope of state-law remedies for the age and disability 
discrimination involved in recent cases reveal that their substantive 
and procedural protections fall short of what is provided by federal 
law (i.e., the ADEA and the ADA).101 More generally, most states 
provide a partial waiver of sovereign immunity and permit suit under 
97. See, e.g. , Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001); 
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 n.*; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996); 
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 n.2 (1985); see also Nevada Dep't of 
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1994 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (making similar 
points). 
98. Prior to Seminole Tribe, the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence could be 
read as establishing a forum-allocation principle by recognizing an obligation of the states to 
provide monetary relief in their own courts when such relief was barred in federal court. 
Seminole Tribe and later cases, especially Alden v. Maine, however, seem to stand for the 
principle that an unconsenting state is immune from a damage action in either federal or 
state court. For a thorough analysis of this shift, see Carlos Manuel Vasquez, What Is Elev­
enth Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.L 1683 (1997). 
99. On the other hand, the presence and efficacy of other federal- and state-law reme­
dies might be relevant to the issue of whether a remedy provided by Congress is propor­
tional to the constitutional violation being addressed. See supra note 29 & accompanying 
text See also Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1980 (describing "important shortcomings of some state 
[parental leave] policies" before passage of the FMLA, including limited available reme­
dies). 
100. P. 94 (finding the possibility of state-law remedies for patentees, as suggested by 
the Court in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 644-45 (1999), unlikely since "[e]xisting patent law largely preempted 
the state courts")); P. 183 n. * (plaintiffs in Kimel had no other remedy available). 
101. See Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Pro­
tection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1075 (2002) (surveying all 50 
states indicating, inter alia, that less than one-half of states have substantive law protecting 
disabled persons comparable to the ADA, and many states limit remedies (e.g., damages, 
attorneys' fees) that would be available under federal law); Brent W. Landau, Note, State 
Employees and Sovereign Immunity: Alternatives and Strategies for Enforcing Federal Em­
ployment Laws, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 169 (2002) (surveying all fifty states for employment 
laws regarding age, disability, minimum wage, and family leave, revealing, inter alia, that 
many states have no such laws, and the state laws that do exist often lack the full substantive 
and remedial protection found in federal law). 
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certain circumstances, but often the procedures and remedies 
provided fall short of that in a normal civil action. 102 While on paper 
the situation might look bleak for a plaintiff seeking relief against 
a state, to my knowledge there is very little empirical work on how 
often such remedies are used, rates of settlement, or other factors 
which would inform a judgment on the true worth of these alternative 
remedies. . 
As mentioned earlier, the Court has pointed to exceptions or 
alternatives to the bar of Eleventh Amendment immunity, notably 
enforcement actions by the federal government, private actions for 
injunctive relief, and private actions for damages against individual 
state officers. Judge Noonan acknowledges the exceptions (pp. 43-51) 
but doesn't seem impressed by their breadth. Someone who is im­
pressed is John Jeffries, who has famously argued that the "Eleventh 
Amendment almost never matters."103 For example, aside from the 
exceptions mentioned, Jeffries observes that almost all states, as a 
matter of law or policy, will defend and indemnify state officials in 
suits for damages.104 Thus, states are paying damage awards despite 
their Eleventh Amendment protection. 
Yet none of these exceptions are panaceas. Absent significant 
expansion of the numbers and responsibilities of U.S. Attorneys, pub­
lic enforcement of federal law will not replace private actions. 105 
Injunctive relief might be limited by restrictions on the scope of Ex 
parte Young.106 Damage actions against individual officers might be 
barred by qualified immunity in particular circumstances.107 As Judge 
Noonan recognizes (p. 142), the new frontier of Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence will be Court review of statutes conditioning federal 
102. Most states permit themselves to be sued in a court of claims or another specialized 
tribunal. They often limit the right to a jury trial or place ceilings on full compensation for 
damages, however. See Joanne C. Brant, The Ascent of Sovereign Immunity, 83 IOWA L. 
REV. 767, 801-03 (1998). 
103. Jeffries, supra note 13, at 49. 
104. Id. at 50; see also Vasquez, supra note 98, at 1795-96 (listing statutes from almost all 
the states providing for indemnification and further noting that collective-bargaining agree­
ments can provide that as well). 
Yet if Jeffries is correct and if a "striking feature of the sovereign immunity cases is their 
apparent relative inefficacy as devices for protecting federalism," Fallon, supra note 48, at 
459, it is curious why state attorneys general have expended so much energy on such cases, 
as documented in Part Ill, supra. 
105. Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Fwure of Federalism, l 999 SUP. 
Cr. REV. l, 62-63; Landau, supra note 101, at 194-97. 
106. In Seminole Tribe, the Court suggested that Ex parte Young-type relief might not 
be appropriate "where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforce­
ment against a State of a statutorily created right." Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44, 74 (1996). Such schemes are not uncommon. Arguably the ADA, ADEA, and 
FMLA - all subject to past or pending Eleventh Amendment challenges in the Court - are 
examples of such schemes. Landau, supra note 101, at 197-99. 
107. Landau, supra note 101, at 200. 
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spending on states waiving the immunity.108 That, coupled with possi­
bly renewed efforts by Congress to act under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, will probably keep the Court busy for years 
to come. 
CONCLUSION: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN 
Soon after he joined the Court, Justice Scalia had the opportunity 
to opine on the correctness of Hans. He did so in a way that might 
have suggested that he was open to overruling the case.109 Shortly 
thereafter, he closed the door and declined to overrule Hans. In doing 
so, however, he did not undertake a vigorous defense of Hans on its 
own terms. Rather he seemed more concerned with the effect that 
retroactively overturning Hans would have on the interpretation of 
statutes in the intervening period.1 10 Then in Seminole Tribe, he joined 
an opinion that constitutionalized Hans. 1 1 1  
108. For a sampling of the burgeoning literature on this issue, see Mitchell N. Berman, 
et al., State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to "Fix" Florida 
Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1037·(2001); Landau, supra note 101 , at 201-
05; Susan M. Luken, Comment, Irreconcilable Differences: The Spending Clause and the 
Eleventh Amendment: Limiting Congress's Use of Conditional Spending to Circumvent Elev­
enth Amendment Immunity, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 693 (2002). 
109. In Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation, Justice Scalia 
stated that for him, 
both the correctness of Hans as an original matter, and the feasibility, if it was wrong, of cor­
recting it without distorting what we have done in tacit reliance upon it, [are) complex 
enough questions that I am unwilling to address them in a case whose presentation focused 
on other matters. 
483 U.S. 468, 496 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
110. In his discussion of Hans, Justice Scalia stated in part as follows: 
Even if I were wrong, however, about the original meaning of the Constitution, or the as­
sumption adopted by the Eleventh Amendment, or the structural necessity for federal­
question suits against the States, it cannot possibly be denied that the question is at least 
close. In that situation, the mere venerability of an answer consistently adhered to for almost 
a century, and the difficulty of changing, or even clearly identifying, the intervening law that 
has been based on that answer, strongly argue against a change . . . .  Moreover, unlike the 
vast majority of judicial decisions, Hans has had a pervasive effect upon statutory law, auto­
matically assuring that private damages actions created by federal law do not extend against 
the States . . . .  It is impossible to say how many extant statutes would have included an ex­
plicit preclusion of suits against States if it had not been thought that such suits were auto­
matically barred . . . .  
I would therefore decline respondents' invitation to overrule Hans v. Louisiana. 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 ,  34-35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
Dan Meltzer is unpersuaded by this congressional-reliance argument. Since 1 973 (in the 
Employees of the Department of Public Health, 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973), case), he says, 
Congress has had to deal with a plain-statement requirement in the Eleventh Amendment 
context, and in "that legal environment, it is chimerical to suppose that overruling Hans 
would suddenly subject the states to liability not fairly contemplated by Congress." Meltzer, 
supra note 71,  at 32. He has a point, but it ignores congressional activity from 1890, when 
Hans was decided, to 1989. During that period, Scalia argues, Congress may have drafted 
legislation on the assumption that the Hans barrier prevented private enforcement for 
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Justice Scalia passed up an opportunity to stake out a principled, 
conservative position on the Eleventh Amendment. Put another way, 
he closed the window on the possibility of developing the "middle 
ground" that Judge Noonan calls for in his book. 
Where might such middle ground exist?1 12 It could be some combi­
nation of the following. Hans could be overruled, but only prospec­
tively. Or Hans could be left intact, but reinterpreted as a federal 
common law decision, making it capable of being statutorily abrogated 
by Congress's Article I or Fourteenth Amendment powers.113 The 
clear-statement requirements could be left intact,1 14 and congressional 
money damages, even if that assumption is not clear from the text or the legislative history. 
Were the Hans barrier not there, perhaps the legislation would have been drafted differently 
or not enacted at all. All of these assumptions are worthy of further �cholarly inquiry, espe­
cially for the 1890-1973 period. 
111. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68-71 (1996); see also supra note 54. 
112. The discussion that follows has been informed by Young, supra note 105, particu­
larly at 70-73, where he discusses a "possible middle ground," to "break [the) impasse" in the 
Court over the Eleventh Amendment. 
113. This is a position advocated by at least two Justices, see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 
84-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 130-31 (Souter, J., dissenting). See generally Martha A. 
Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. 
PA. L. REV. 515 (1978); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and 
State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988). 
114. Clear-statement rules of statutory construction are often, explicitly or implicitly, 
based on constitutional norms. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip Frickey, Quasi­
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
593 (1992); Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1959 (1994). 
Recently, Professor Elhauge has advanced a general theory to explain the existence of 
canons of statutory construction that frequently result in decisions that are statutorily over­
ridden by Congress. Many of the canons, he says, "reflect neither efforts to divine statutory 
meaning nor attempts to further judicial or legislative preferences, but rather reflect default 
rules designed to elicit legislative preferences under conditions of uncertainty." Einer El­
hauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2165 (2002). 
Normally, the rules of construction should estimate "the preferences of the enacting or 
current government." Id. (internal citation omitted). But "when enactable preferences are 
unclear, often the best choice is instead a preference-eliciting default rule that is more likely 
to provoke a legislative reaction that resolves the statutory indeterminacy . . . .  " Id. 
The clear-statement rules in the Eleventh Amendment context, he continues, seem at 
first blush to be examples of preference-eliciting default rules, a conclusion reinforced by the 
frequent examples of statutory overrides in such cases. Id. at 2250. But he discounts this con­
clusion, since: 
These canons cannot truly be justified on preference-eliciting grounds for they favor a set of 
parties - the states - that has unusually strong, not weak, access to the congressional 
agenda to get statutes overridden. Given the logic of preference-eliciting default rules, this 
would, if anything, justify a default rule of resolving ambiguities against the states. 
Id. (emphasis added; footnote omitted). He goes on to explain these canons on other 
grounds, such as rules estimating the likely preference of Congress on the issue. Id. at 2251-
52. 
It is true that the Court's (or lower courts') use of the clear-statement rules has been 
overruled by Congress on several occasions. Id. at 2250 n.313 (giving examples). But it does 
not follow that the states have extraordinary access to Congress to prevent such overrides. 
This implicates the political-safeguards-of-federalism theory, noted above. The support for 
that theory, in my judgment, is weak, both in the Eleventh Amendment context and else-
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statutes would be subject to something more than perfunctory rational 
basis review, especially if a state presented compelling empirical evi­
dence that a private remedy for damages would indeed undermine its 
fiscal integrity. By constitutionalizing Hans and cutting off Congress's 
Article I powers, Seminole Tribe limits the scope of a middle ground. 
It makes it more difficult to struggle toward a middle ground. Even in 
the wake of that case, and without overruling later cases, a middle 
ground might encompass, say, more benign views of congressional 
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,1 15 or under 
the conditional spending power. Judge Noonan's provocative and 
engaging monograph should aid thoughtful and reflective people on 
all sides of the continuing and contentious Eleventh Amendment 
debate, but especially conservatives who, like him, would like to find 
some middle ground. 
where. It follows that clear-statement canons in this instance can be justified as preference­
eliciting. 
1 15. Cf P. 142 (suggesting that under Section Five, Congress could "do piecemeal what 
it had attempted to do wholesale"). Perhaps the Court's decision in Nevada Department of 
Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003), is a portend of a middle ground. One 
reaction to the decision described the Court as · engaging in "a surprising break with its 
march toward states' rights." Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 6-3, Rule Workers Can Sue States 
Over Leave, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at Al. No doubt, this was not only due to the 
upholding of a high-profile federal statute against an Eleventh Amendment challenge, but 
because Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion, and Justice O'Connor joined the 
majority, both of whom had been in the majorities in prior, post-Boerne Eleventh 
Amendment cases. Still, as I argue above, see supra note 29, the majority opinion is hardly 
revolutionary. It faithfully applies the framework of Seminole Tribe and its progeny, and 
distinguishes, and does not claim to limit, prior decisions. Hibbs, 1 23 S. Ct. at 1976-77. On 
the other hand, it does arguably take a more nuanced view of the legislative record than did 
prior decisions, and the Court acknowledged the prophylactic nature of the remedy in the 
FMLA, as one that did not merely create a remedy for a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 1 983. That said, a number of factors counsel in favor of a restrained 
interpretation of the decision. For example, the majority noted that state gender discrimina­
tion is subject to heightened scrutiny under the Four'teenth Amendment, thus making it 
"easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations." Id. at 1 974-75. 
Also, the majority emphasized that the FMLA "affects only one aspect of the employment 
relationship," id. at 1975, and found "significant . . .  the many other limitations that Congress 
placed on the . . .  scope" of the FMLA damages remedy. Id. In short, the case seems best 
read as an incremental change of the current Eleventh Amendment regime, though one I 
think that Judge Noonan would welcome. 
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APPENDIX: ELEVENTH AMENDMENT CASES, 1964-2002 
Case Name Citation Year # # for # against other # states 
amicus state state amicus on 
briefs immunity immunity briefs amicus 
filed briefs 
Parden v. 377 U.S. 184 1964 0 0 0 0 0 
Terminal Ry. 
of the Ala. 
State Docks 
Dep't 
Employees of 411 U.S. 279 1973 1 0 I 0 0 
the Dep't of 
Pub. Health 
& Welfare v. 
Dep't of Pub. 
Health & 
Welfare 
Edelman v. 4 15 U.S. 651 1974 2 0 2 0 0 
Jordan 
Fitzpatrick v. 427 U.S. 445 1976 6 3 3 0 22 
Bitzer 
Milliken v. 433 U.S. 267 1977 4 1 2 1 2 
Bradley 
Hutto v. 437 U.S. 678 1978 8 3 3 2 5 
Finney 
Quern v. 440 U.S. 332 1979 1 I 0 0 I 
Jordan 
Florida Dep't 458 U.S. 670 1982 1 1 0 0 1 1+ Vir-






Pennhurst 465 U.S. 89 1 984 1 () 0 1 22+ 
State Sch. & Puerto 




Atascadero 473 U.S. 234 1 985 4 1 3 () () 
State Hosp. v. 
Scanlon 
Green v. 474 U.S. 64 1985 () () () 0 () 
Mansour 
May 2003] The Eleventh Amendment 
Papasan v. 478 U.S. 265 1986 0 0 
Allain 





Pennsylvania 491 U.S. 1 1989 6 1 
v. Union Gas 
Co. 
Missouri v. 491 U.S. 274 1989 1 0 
Jenkins 
Dellmuth v. 491 U.S. 223 1989 2 1 
Muth 




Hilton v. 502 U.S. 197 1 991 2 1 
South Caro-
lina Pub. Rys. 
Comm'n 
B latchford v. 501 U.S. 775 1991 5 2 
Native Viii. of 
Noatak & 
Circle Viii. 
Puerto Rico 506 U.S. 139 1993 2 2 
Aqueduct & 
Sewer Auth. 
v.  Metcalf & 
Eddy, Inc. 
Hess v. Port 513 U.S. 30 1994 3 2 
Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp. 
Seminole 517 U.S. 44 1996 9 2 
Tribe of Fla. 
v. Florida 
Idaho v. 521 U.S. 261 1997 5 1 
Coeur 
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Regents of 519 U.S. 425 1997 2 1 1 0 0, Nat'I 
the Univ. of Conf. of 
Cal. v. John State Le-
Doe gis-
latures 
Cal. & State 523 U.S. 491 1998 7 3 4 0 17 states 
Lands +Guam, 
Comm'n v. Virgin 










Alden v . .  527 U.S. 706 1 999 7 5 2 0 37, Nat'I 




Florida Pre- 527 U.S. 627 1999 1 1  3 6 2 26, Nat'I 
paid Post- Conf. of 
secondary State Le-
Educ. Ex- gis-
pense Bd. v. 
latures 
Coll. Sav. 
Bank & U.S. 
Coll. Sav. 527 U.S. 666 1999 4 2 1 1 28, Nat'I 
Bank v. Flor- Conf. of 





Kimel v. 528 U.S. 62 2000 6 3 1 2 23 
Florida Bd. of 
Regents 





ex rel. Stevens 
Bd. of Trs. of 531 U.S. 356 2001 21 3 12 6+ a 21  
the Univ. of  " state-






May 2003] The Eleventh Amendment 1491 
Raygor v. Re- 534 U.S. 533 2002 2 2 0 0 23+ 
gents of the Guam, 






Lapides v. Bd. 535 U.S. 613 2002 3 1 2 0 29 
of Regents of 
the Univ. Sys. 
of Ga. 
Verizon Md. 535 U.S. 835 2002 3 2 1 0 1 
I nc. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n 
of Md. 
Fed. Mar. 535 U.S. 743 2002 7 3 4 0 38+ 
Comm'n v. Nat'I 
South Caro- Gov. As-
Jina State 
soc. 
Ports Auth. 
